Fourth Distinction. Second Part. About Reception of the Sacrament and not the Thing in Adults Receiving Baptism

56. Concerning the second member of the division [n.9], about one who receives the sacrament and not the thing of the sacrament, which precisely belongs to adults, I ask first whether an adult who does not consent can receive the effect of baptism; second whether an adult who is feigning receives the effect of baptism.

Question One. Whether an Adult who does not Consent can Receive the Effect of Baptism

57. As to the first point [n.56], argument is made that he does not:

No one who does not consent contracts carnal marriage,     therefore not spiritual marriage either, because spiritual consent there is required not less but more; now in baptism a spiritual marriage is as it were contracted, because then the soul is espoused to God; therefore etc     .

58. Again in baptism a certain vow is made of renouncing Satan and clinging to God; but no one who is unwilling or not consenting vows or binds himself to God;     therefore etc     .

59. Again, his own malice harms the baptized more than the malice of the minister doing the baptizing; but in the one baptizing there is required not only consent but the intention of baptizing; therefore much more is the baptized’s consent required.

60. Again, Augustine in a letter [On Baptism against the Donatists IV ch.24 n.31]: as a sponsor responds for the child, so an adult responds for himself; but if the sponsor does not consent, the child for whom he does not consent is not baptized. For it seems that baptism is conferred in virtue of the sponsor’s reply when to the question “Do you wish to be baptized?” the sponsor replies “I wish,” and the priest subjoins “And I baptize you etc.;” but what is done under a condition is nothing if the condition do not exist.

61. To the contrary:

Decretals III tit.42 ch.3, Gregory IX, ‘About baptism and its effect’: “He who is drawn forward by terrors and punishments and, lest he incur harm, receives the sacrament of baptism, such a one, just like him too who comes to baptism feigning, receives the character of Christianity impressed on him, and he himself, as if willing conditionally though absolutely he does not will, is to be compelled to the observance of the Christian faith.” Therefore, he who is absolutely not willing receives the sacrament of baptism.

I. To the Question

62. Here I draw a distinction both on the part of him who is called an adult and on the part of him who is called non-willing.

A. About an Adult with the Use of Reason or without It

63. About the first: either an adult is not using reason and has never used it (as the empty headed and mad from birth); or he is not using reason now, yet has sometimes had the use of it; or, third, he is actually using reason now.

1. About an Adult who never Uses Reason

64. Judgment about the first must, in brief, be made as about a child [n.16], save that there is a difference in this, that if there be hope of his sometime needing to be cured and coming to have the use of reason, that time must be waited for, so that he may receive the sacrament with greater reverence. But if there be no hope of his ever attaining the use of reason, the sacrament is to be conferred on him at once, because God removes the remedy for salvation from no one.

2. About an Adult not Now Using Reason

65. About the second, namely someone not now using reason [n.63] yet who did at some time use reason, I say that the supposition is that he is now in habit consenting or not consenting according to the way he was actually disposed when, immediately before impediment to his use of reason, he was healthy; namely, if he actually consented then, he is judged to be consenting in habit now; if he actually dissented then he is judged to be dissenting in habit now. And I said ‘immediately’ in the sense that between the act and the impediment no opposite motion of will intervene. And thus I say universally that the one who is habitually disposed can receive the sacrament the way he could before when he was actually this way or that way disposed. But how he who is disposed actually could be baptized will be stated at once in the third part [nn.68-69].

66. But is it expedient to baptize such a one? For many things are lawful which are not expedient, I Corinthians 6.12.

67. I reply that if there be hope he will return to the use of reason, it is more expedient to await the time when he does have the use of reason; for example, it is expedient as regard one asleep to wait the time of his being awake, and as regard one who is deranged the time of a lucid interval. But if there be no hope of him, as of one who falls into some permanent blockage to his use of reason, it is expedient to baptize him (provided however he has the capacity for baptism), because otherwise he would be exposed to the danger of damnation. But how he may be capable will be stated immediately in the discussion of him who has the use of reason [n.69].

3. About an Adult with the Use of Reason

68. About the third case, namely an adult using reason [n.63], I make a distinction about the ‘not consenting’ [n.56] that is put in the question, which can be understood as the negative or the contrary: the negative denies only actual consent, while the contrary posits actual dissent.

69. And the distinction is plain, because ‘not willing’ is not the same as ‘willing against’. If ‘contrary’ is taken as ‘dissenting in act’, then the adult dissents either simply or in a certain respect. And I mean ‘simply’ in the way it was expounded in Ord. III d.15 nn.58-59, 119, that when someone, who wills something simply so as to escape some disadvantage, wills that something (as throwing merchandise overboard into the sea to escape sinking) he wills simply to throw the merchandise overboard, for his will by commanding moves his power to throw overboard, and his will moves itself freely because it cannot be compelled. He is willing simply, then, when he throws the merchandise overboard, but he wills against it in a certain respect, that is he wills against it under a certain condition, because he would will against it if he could save his life in another way.

B. About an Adult who is not Willing

70. If the adult dissents in both ways, I say that he does not receive the sacrament, because God says through Wisdom, Proverbs 23.26, “Sons, give me your heart,” as he does not want anyone who is altogether unwilling to be ascribed to his family; but someone who receives baptism is ascribed thereby to the family of Christ.

71. Nor is it necessary here to distinguish between the one who cries out or protests his dissent by an exterior sign and the one who does not cry out, because if in real truth there is dissent, it is altogether the same as regard God and the truth; but as to the judgment of the Church (which judges of things manifest and presumes that one who keeps silent consents), he who cries out will not be compelled to observance of the Christian religion, but he who does not cry out will be compelled.

72. Nor can the Church here be accused because an injury is done to him who wills against [baptism] but does not cry out; for it is a lesser evil to him that he keep the Christian Law than that he be permitted to act with impunity against it; because it is a lesser evil to do good things against one’s will and to escape evil things than to do freely and with impunity evil things and to lose good things.

73. But if the adult dissents in a certain respect but consents simply (and does so, I say, not only to the washing [of baptism] as if to a certain bath, but to the washing in the way the Church intends to do it), he receives the sacrament, because simply he is willing, although in a certain respect unwilling.

74. And about such an adult the Council of Toledo speaks, which is cited in Decretals III tit. 42 ch.3, Gregory IX, “Those who now a long time ago were compelled into Christianity (because it is already clear that they have been made associates in the divine sacraments) should be compelled to keep the faith that they by necessity took up, lest the name of the Lord be blasphemed and the faith they took up be held as cheap and contemptible.”

75. An example of this: whatever is the way that someone is able to consent to the washing [of baptism], the washing is received in the way in which it is conferred by the Church - and yet, let that someone be unwilling (provided he could escape torments), because he does not believe the washing is worth anything.

76. An example can also be taken from him who does not believe that the words of the ritual formula can have any effect, yet he concedes to the intoner of them that he is saying the formula over him with the intention with which he is wont to say it, saying in his heart ‘Let the formula be worth as much as it can be worth’ - this person should truly be said to have been intoned over; and if such formula intoned over someone were said to be ‘consecration of him to the devil’, he would also be consecrated to the devil.

77. Now the difference of this case, ‘he who dissents in a certain respect’, from the preceding one [n.70], is plain, because he who is simply dissenting does not at all receive the sacrament; and for this reason he would, when the dissent ceases, have to be baptized simply; but he who simply consents, though he dissent in a certain respect, has been baptized, and therefore when this dissent in a certain respect ceases, he is not to be baptized again.

78. But if someone consents only negatively [n.68] I say that he receives the sacrament, because God wills not to bind man to what is impossible or (according to the state of this life) to something too difficult. But now ‘not being distracted’ seems too difficult for man in this state of life, because, according to Augustine On Free Choice 3.25 n.255, “It is not in our power what things when seen we are touched by;” therefore God willed not to set down the salvation of man with the condition ‘if he not be distracted’. Therefore, he did not want to oblige anyone, in receiving baptism, not to be distracted [on distraction, cf. Scotus Lectura III d.17 n.26].

79. And so it is universally with all the other sacraments; for the priest, in confecting the sacrament [of the eucharist], is not obliged (I mean, necessarily) to the fact that he not be distracted; for a distracted priest truly confects, provided however that before, while he was robing, he intend to celebrate mass according to the manner of the Church.

80. And if you ask, let it be that someone not consenting actually yet consenting virtually (in the way that the example about the celebrating priest is posited [n.79]), receive the sacrament, does not he too surely receive it who consents only in habit (and the distinction between these, habitually and virtually, is plain in Ord. II d.41 n.10)? And let it be that he does, does not he too surely receive it who only negatively does not consent, and he too surely who only negatively does not dissent, because he has neither the opposite habit nor the opposite act?

81. About the first [he who consents only in habit] it could be said that such a one is judged to be consenting in habit because he at sometime had actual consent with no dissent intervening. And such a one, though using reason, receives the sacrament, because he does not for any condition seem to be less capable if he is using reason than if, having used it before, he is not using it now. But in such a one who is not using reason now, yet having used it before, habitual consent would also be sufficient; therefore, here too.

82. About the second [he who negatively neither consents nor dissents, n.80], although it were difficult to find such a person, especially one who had sometime thought of baptism before, because either it would have pleased him then to be baptized or it would not have pleased him (indeed would have displeased him), and according to his last movement he would be judged to be such in habit for the future; yet if someone were wholly not consenting nor dissenting, both actually and in habit, and yet he is using reason, he would not be capable of baptism; for from the fact he is using reason he ought to have, or have had, some devotion for the sacrament, if it has to be valid for him - for otherwise he would seem to be contemning it.

II. To the Initial Arguments

83. To the first argument [n.57] I say that in baptism there is more properly an adoption to sonship than to marriage, because a child cannot properly be said to contract a marriage since he does not have use of reason, the use of which is required for any contract. But in adoption the consent or act alone of the adopter suffices even if the one adopted has no consent or act.

84. To the second [in fact the third, n.59] I say that malice can exist in the minister or insofar as he is minister (namely in administering badly), either because he does not believe well or because he does not intend to confer the sacrament. And this malice, especially the malice of not intending, prevents the sacrament from being conferred more than does the malice of morals in the recipient (and the reason will be stated in the following distinction [d.5 nn.18, 24]). Now there can be another malice of the minister, not insofar as he is minister, but concomitant (as that he is in mortal sin); and this does not prevent the sacrament from being conferred. It is plain, therefore, that the intention of the minister impedes the sacrament but not any other malice. But it does not follow from this that the non-intention of the recipient impedes it, because in a second agent there is required also what per se belongs to the agent, and this is the ‘to intend’ in an agent acting by reason, but intention does not belong per se to the recipient insofar as he is such.

85. To the third [in fact the second, n.58] one must say that if the adult to be baptized willingly intends to renounce the devil and his pomps, everything that precedes the reception of baptism is not of the necessity of the sacrament, but belongs only to its solemnity.

86. To the next [n.60] I concede that the custom of the Church is good one, because the Church baptizes no adult unless he respond for himself; and it is a praiseworthy and reasonable custom, so that he be ascribed to the family of Christ who is willing. But although he not respond, namely because he does not have use of reason (as someone asleep), the sacrament could be conferred on him, provided however he is consenting in habit. But as was said before [n.67], it is not expedient to do this but to wait for the time when he may actually consent.

Question Two. Whether an Adult who is Feigning Receives the Effect of Baptism

87. Proceeding thus to the second point [n.56]: and it is argued that an adult who is feigning may receive the grace of baptism.

Because Galatians 3.27, “As many of you as are baptized in Christ have put on Christ.” But no one puts on Christ unless, by receiving grace, he become conformed to Christ;     therefore etc     .

88. Again, if someone feigning do not receive grace then, since he cannot be saved without baptismal grace, he would, when the feint is given up, have to be baptized another time. The consequence is plain from a similarity, that a feigning penitent is bound to do penance truly for the same sins. The consequent is unacceptable [sc. he must be baptized again], as is plain from the authorities of the saints in the text [Lombard, Sent. IV d.4 ch.2].

89. Again, baptism expels sin; not the sin which is not present, because that was already expelled before; but what has been expelled cannot be expelled; therefore, it expels the sin which is then present. Therefore, no sin in someone who is feigning impedes the effect of baptism.

90. To the contrary:

Augustine, Sermon 351, On the Utility of Doing Penance ch.2 (and it is in Lombard’s text): “When anyone who is established as arbiter of his own will comes to the sacrament of the faithful, unless he repent of his old life, he cannot begin a new one.” 91. Again, Augustine, On Baptism Against the Donatists I ch.12 n.18, “Baptism begins to be effective then for salvation when the pretense by a true confession has departed - the pretense that, with the heart persevering in malice, does not allow the washing away of sins to take place.” Therefore, the pretense was preventing the washing in baptism to happen, and consequently preventing the grace.

I. To the Question

92. I reply: “He who feigns is pretending one thing on the outside but has another on the inside” [Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Sent., ad loc.]. Therefore, someone can, in receiving baptism, be feigning in two ways:

A. About him who Feigns on the Outside to be Willing, is Unwilling on the Inside

93. In one way because he shows himself to be willing to receive the [baptismal] washing in the way the Church intends to confer it, and yet he has the opposite in his mind.

94. And this person does not receive the sacrament (as is plain from the preceding question [nn.70]), because he is simply unwilling with respect to sacramental washing though he is willing with respect to washing; and if such a person were later to give up the pretense, he would need to be baptized. Yet the Church would judge him to be consenting to sacramental washing and would compel him to observance of the Christian faith, because the Church assumes the better side when signs are more indicative of it (as the Church presumes about someone who feigns to know her to whom he is pledged that, after marriage, he does know her with marital affection; and therefore the Church compels him to true matrimonial consent with her).

B. About him who Feigns on the Outside to Be Disposed, is not Disposed on the Inside

95. In another way can someone be feigning, by showing himself to be disposed to receive the sacrament and yet is not disposed interiorly, either because he does not have right faith or because he has then some mortal sin, actual or past, which he does not in any way have attrition for. And the saints and doctors commonly speak of a baptized person who is feigning in this second way [Lombard, Sent. IV d.4 ch.2].

1. A Person so Feigning does not in Baptism Receive Grace but through Penance

96. And about someone thus feigning [n.95] I say that since God does not justify someone who is unwilling (according to Augustine’s “He who created you without you will not justify you without you” [ Sermo 149 ch. 11 n.13]), this person - who has in actuality a bar against grace (namely infidelity or some sin that he is now committing by act of will, or that he committed before), and is no way displeased with himself - in no way receives grace, according to Augustine’s remark above [n.90] “anyone who is established as arbiter of his own will     etc .” And of this man is understood the verse from Wisdom 1.5, “The Holy Spirit flees from him who feigns discipline.”

97. And if the objection is made that therefore      this man seems to be in perplexity, because the way of salvation is not open to him, since he cannot be baptized again (because he has been baptized), and without baptismal grace he cannot be saved - I reply: he cannot be baptized because God instituted baptism to be unrepeatable lest, because of the full remission of guilt and punishment that takes place in it, occasion be given for more often doing wrong were baptism able to be more often repeated.a

a.a [Interpolated text] Now the fact that in baptism there is remission of all sin is stated by Ambrose [rather Ambrosiaster On the Epistle to the Romans 11.29] in Gratian Decretum p.3, ‘On Consecration’ d.4 ch.99 (and it is taken from the gloss on the words “the gifts of God are without repentance,” Romans 11.29): “The grace of God in baptism,” he says, “does not require sighing or weeping or any work, but it bestows everything gratuitously.” The Master also in Sent. IV d.4 ch.6 n.1.

98. But from no one, however often he falls, has God closed off in this life the path of salvation; for he did not wish to bind any of us to a greater mercy toward our neighbor than he wished to have himself toward his subject; and when Peter asks, Matthew 18.21-22, how often he should forgive his brother who sins against him, whether up to “seven times,” he replies to him, “up to seventy times seven.” Indeed, according to Augustine in his homily on that place [Sermon 83 on Matthew 18], “thousands of thousands of times;” and universally, as often as a man has sinned and acknowledged it, so often should he be forgiven. Therefore, did God thus institute some other remedy, namely the sacrament of penance, as many times as someone will have sinned as wayfarer.

99. And then I say the way of salvation for this person [nn.95-96] is open through true penance for the pretense, according to the authority adduced from Augustine [n.91].

100. And if the objection is made, “how will he get the grace of baptism or its effect?”

In one way it can be said that the pretense is only dismissed through true penance; but once it has been dismissed, baptism has its effect as regard all the sins preceding baptism that, however, were not the cause of the pretense in baptism. For example, someone has committed seven mortal sins before baptism, and on coming to baptism he has attrition about six and the seventh actually pleases him, or about it he in no way has attrition now. That seventh is alone the cause of his pretense in baptism; he must then be truly penitent about this seventh sin, both in itself and insofar as it was the cause of his pretense in baptism.

101. Which I say to this extent, that perhaps he has sinned with a new mortal sin, doing irreverence to the sacrament of baptism by receiving it with such pretense. But after the departure of the pretense, which was the impediment to the effect of baptism, God confers the grace of baptism as remedy against the other sins that would have been deleted in baptism if the pretense had not occurred.

102. And therefore it is not necessary for such a feigner to have true penance for the other sins, nor perhaps a new attrition for them (besides the one that was had before baptism); but once the only impediment has been removed, then just as God would have stood by his sign before [sc. the sign of baptism] to cause the effect of it, or to give it when baptism was received, had there not been an impediment in the receiver, so is he always ready, after reception of the sign, to stand by him who received it, so as to cause the effect of it when the impediment ceases.

103. Nor is it necessary to say that the character in the one feigning does anything, but only that God from the same pact [sc. the pact to give grace through the sacramental signs: d.1 nn.315, 322, d.14 q.4 nn.7-8] also stands afterwards by him who was the recipient, as soon as the obstacle is taken away.

2. Objections to the Aforesaid Solution

104. But argument against this is made, because this pretense, according to you [sc. Scotus, nn.98-99], is destroyed through penance; but one mortal sin cannot be destroyed without all of them being destroyed, because according to Augustine [ps.-Augustine, On True and False Penance ch.9 n.24; also Gratian Decretum p.2 causa 33 q.3 d.3 ch.42], “It is impious to hope for a half pardon from God.” Therefore, all the other sins are destroyed by that penance; so baptismal grace does not destroy those others.

105. Again, no mortal sin that remains after baptism can be destroyed without penance, because “it is a second account after shipwreck,” according to Jerome [Epistle 130, to Demetrias n.9; Lombard, Sent. IV d.12 ch.1 n.1]. But those other sins, which are not cause of the pretense, are present after baptism; therefore they are only destroyed by penance. Of if you imagine them to be destroyed by baptism when the impediment to the effect of baptism is taken away [as Scotus thinks, n.100], why cannot the pretense, which was the cause of the impediment, be thus taken away, when the impediment ceases, by baptism itself?

3. Response to the First Objection

106. If it be said to the first of these [n.104] that ‘penance, as far as concerns itself, could delete all sins, yet when it is prevented by some higher or more potent cause, it does not delete them; but that other cause is so present here that baptismal grace as to the other six sins prevents penance or the effect of it’ -

This does not seem reasonable, because pretense is naturally taken away first before anything is caused by baptism; but in that prior moment he must have true penance, because “pretense is not taken away without true penance,” according to Augustine, On Baptism against the Donatists I ch.12 n.18; “true penance reconciles fully to God in every respect,” Ps.-Augustine, On True and False Penance ch.9 n.24 [in Lombard’s text, IV d.15 ch.7 n.4]; therefore Baptism cannot prevent the effect of penance as to anything that needs to be deleted; rather penance prevents as to everything.

107. It can therefore be said differently that true penance perfectly reconciles to God, and consequently leaves no sin behind. But yet penance does not per se cure everything that was present, but only what is the object of the penance (namely what the penitent is penitent about). But sometimes it is necessary for ‘every sin that is deleted’ to be the object of penance, namely if all the sins were committed after baptism; and sometimes it is not necessary, as in the matter at hand.

108. Therefore not by virtue of penance are all these sins dismissed; but in the sacrament of confession they are partly dismissed by penance, partly by another cause; and so there is got there not a half pardon but a total pardon from God; not however total through penance, because there was no need to do penance for all the sins that were present.

109. And accordingly it should be said that those six sins [n.100] are destroyed as to punishment and as to guilt, nor is it necessary to have contrition or make confession or satisfaction for them, but only for the seventh that was the cause of the pretense.

4. Response to the Second Objection

110. To the second [n.105] it can be said that although all the mortal sins are present after baptism, yet none of them was the cause that they had not already been deleted in baptism. But the remaining seventh one was the cause why neither it nor the others have been deleted; and therefore it is rational that with respect to it baptism has no efficacy, but that it does have effect with respect to the others, because it has formally prevented the effect of baptism while the others have not. And then the proposition ‘mortal sin is not destroyed after baptism save through penance’ [n.105] must be understood of sin committed after baptism, or of sin altogether inherent, namely such that there was no contrition or attrition about it in baptism or after baptism.

111. It can be said in another way that when he now truly repents of his pretense, a grace is infused into him more perfect than would be the grace that would be infused precisely by virtue of penitence, so that it includes in itself the perfection of penitential and baptismal grace; and in this way baptism has its effect because it gives to someone who is repentant for his pretense a grace equivalent to baptismal grace, together with the grace that is merited from repenting.

a. Objection to this Response

112. But against this it is argued that then he would gain an advantage from this pretense, more than if he had not then been pretending and afterwards had fallen into a sin similar to the pretense; for if he had fallen into pretense in this way and were now repentant, he would not now have grace save by virtue of penance alone. But you [sc. Scotus] say that he who then was feigning in baptism has as it were a double grace in repenting [n.111].

b. Triple Response to the Objection

113. Here it can, in one way, be said that he does not gain an advantage but rather a loss; because at the time of baptism, and in the subsequent time up to penitence, he is a son of Gehenna [Matthew 23.15], and also all his works are dead. But if he had not been feigning, he would then, and afterwards up to his fall, have been a son of the Kingdom, and his works would have been alive, whereby he would have merited increase of grace and glory.

114. It can in another way be said that if he had not been feigning and if, having lapsed later, he were truly to do penance, he would, in doing penance, receive as much grace as he does now when doing penance for his pretense, because by rising through penance from mortal sin he recovers all the grace from which he fell, and some grace through penance in addition, and this either in reality or in divine acceptation; but about this below in the matter on penance [Ord. IV d.14 q.4].

115. It can in a third way chiefly be said that he who does penance for his pretense alone receives grace by virtue of the penance, and does not in this way receive a greater grace than if he had not been feigning in baptism and if, falling after baptism, he were now to rise again through penance. For it is not likely that equal grace not be given to someone equally penitent and about an equal or lesser sin. But he who has lapsed after baptism, although he has in some respect sinned more gravely than he who feigned, yet he who feigned has sinned more gravely in some other respect, because he has done irreverence to the sacrament.

116. And then the words that are said about the effect of baptism (which effect he obtains who does penance for his pretense) are to be taken to mean, not that in that penance he receive some grace by virtue of baptism (because his receiving of baptism was dead, and the dead cannot revive), but because he is absolved from the precept about receiving baptism, because he has fulfilled that precept. But the fulfilling of it was of no value to him for salvation before the penance. He receives the grace of baptism, therefore, when he repents, because he is a son of the Kingdom; nor is he obligated to receive baptism for the purpose of being a son of the Kingdom, because he has fulfilled that precept. And here note that someone actually sinning mortally in some act can fulfill in that act an affirmative precept.

II. To the Initial Arguments

117. To the first argument [n.87] I say that everyone baptized has to this extent put on Christ, that he is ascribed to the family of Christ; but he has not put on Christ through charity and grace. The first ‘putting on’ can be said to be common to everyone in the family; but the second is the ‘putting on’ of sons [Bonaventure Sent. IV d.4 p.1 dub.4]. Or it can be said that he is not baptized in Christ but in the name of Christ, because not in virtue of Christ interiorly baptizing him.

118. To the second [n.88] the answer is plain in the body of the question [nn.93-99].

119. To the third [n.89] I say that baptism expels sin - not because in the same person there is grace and sin in such a way that in the instant in which baptism has its effect it does not expel the sin that is then present (for which reason [as the objection tries to conclude, n.89] ‘no sin in someone who is feigning impedes baptism’), for grace and sin do not stand with each other at the same time; but baptismal grace expels all sin that was present up to that point. Now the guilt that is then actually present, or which is actually then being committed (because there is no attrition or contrition present about it), baptism does not expel, because it finds the obstacle of a will that is contrary.